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ANTITRUST'S PER SE RULE:

REPORTS OF ITS

DEATH ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED
SETH

E.

LIPNER*

In the five years between 1975 and 1980, the Supreme Court, led by
"the new antitrust majority,"' appeared to undo thirty years of antitrust
precedent. A series of cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act 2 discarded
the much criticized per se rule in favor of the rule of reason. Due in large
part to a change in membership on the Court, 3 the transition has had resounding effects.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Sociey ,4 however, the Supreme
Court may have reversed this trend. In a four-three opinion, the Court declared that competing physicians who had agreed to use a maximum fee
schedule had violated the Sherman Act per se. 5 Less than ten years ago the
decision would not have been considered controversial or even noteworthy;
today it is both.
This article will examine the current state of the law under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Part I traces, in detail, the series of events which brought
about increased reliance on the rule of reason, reviewing in particular the
Burger Court's price-fixing cases. Part II reports the Maricopa County decision. Finally, Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Marcopa
County and attempts to assess the status of antitrust law under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.

I.

THE BURGER COURT AND THE PER SE RULE

Success or failure in an antitrust case frequently depends upon whether
the court applies theper se rule of illegality. This rule states that if a practice
falls into a forbidden category, 6 it will be condemned without inquiry into
*
B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1978; J.D., Albany Law School of Union University, 1980; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1981; Assistant Professor of Law,
Bernard M. Baruch College of City University of New York. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Robert and Roslyn Griffin for their editorial assistance and fine attention to
detail.
1. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 643 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976)).
3. The resignation of Justices Douglas and Black during the 1970's had a major impact
upon antitrust law. For many years, these two jurists greatly influenced the development of
antitrust law. A perusal of a standard law school antitrust casebook reveals a total of 20 cases in
which one of them authored the majority opinion. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY
& H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1975).
4. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
5. 1d. at 344-45.
6. Over the years the forbidden categories have been expanded to include: price fixing,
division of markets by competitors, group boycotts, tie-ins, and certain exchanges of price information. Vertical division of markets by manufacturers, placed into theper se category in United
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its justifications or procompetitive benefits. 7 Since the inception of our anti8
trust laws, price fixing has been held to be one of the forbidden practices.
Thus, characterization of a practice as price fixing inevitably leads toper se
treatment. During the Warren Court era, the per se rule was used with re10
markable frequency; 9 its complement, the rule of reason, which calls for a
1
full-scale economic analysis of the impact of the restraint,' was never in12
case.
price-fixing
a
decide
to
Court
Warren
voked by the
In a series of cases beginning in 1975, the Supreme Court, under the
influence of its new members, resurrected the rule of reason. The Burger
Court quickly expanded the breadth of the rule of reason and brought its
previously undefined contours into sharper focus. Increased reliance on the
rule of reason was necessarily accompanied by a decreased role for the per se
States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), was withdrawn from that category in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See infa text accompanying
notes 31-42. See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-77 (1977);
Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1979).
7. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Northern Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
8. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271 (6th Cir. 1898), modtfled, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,213 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 167; Bork, The Rule ofReason and the Per Se Concept.- PriceFtxng and
Market Dirnsitns, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Redlich, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (perse rule applied to
division of markets by competitors); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum
price fixing); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (division of markets
by manufacturers); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (refusal to deal
by manufacturer induced by competitor); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (price
fixing by manufacturer); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (concerted refusal to deal induced by competitors). But see United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (stating that aper se rule was not being applied; the
majority opinion, authored by Justice Douglas, is unclear as to the standard utilized.).
10. The rule of reason dates back to Chief Justice Edward White's opinion in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The application of the rule was expounded upon by
Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The rule of
reason has lain largely dormant since that time, although it has made occasional appearances.
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
11. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where Justice Brandeis
stated:
The . . . test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. at 238. See also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-99 (1978)
(Justice Stevens, for the majority, stating that inquiry under the rule is directed at forming a
judgment about the impact of a restraint upon competition); cf. id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (questioning the narrowness of the majority's approach to the rule, at least as applied
to professional organizations).
12. But see United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
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rule. While some of this decrease has been substantive and substantial, other
aspects of it have been more symbolic. For instance, in the first case, Goldfarb
v. Vrgini'a State Bar,"3 the Court held that dissemination and enforcement of
a minimum fee schedule for attorneys constituted "a classic illustration of
price-fixing."' 4 But despite this finding, the Court never expressly declared
5
the practice "per se" unlawful. '
The State and County Bar Associations in Virginia had distributed a
"suggested" minimum fee schedule to all the state's attorneys.' 6 When Mr.
and Mrs. Goldfarb sought an attorney for a title search, they could not find
one who would charge less than the suggested fee. 17 Compliance with the
schedule had been secured by the State Bar Association's publication of ethical opinions indicating that failure to adhere to the fee schedule was
"misconduct."'
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, distinguished
several cases which had not involved the per se rule,' 9 demonstrating, for
instance, that the schedule was more than merely advisory.2 ° The opinion
thus suggests that an advisory schedule, 2 1 or perhaps one involving past
transactions, 22 might have been lawful. 23 Since the Bar Association en13.

421 U.S. 773 (1975).

14. Id. at 783.
15. The words '"perse" are never used. Instead, Chief Justice Burger noted that the practice was unusually damaging, an irrelevancy under the per se rule. id. at 782. See supra text
accompanying note 7. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 564
(9th Cir. 1980) (Larson, J., dissenting), rev'd 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (stating that nevertheless aper
se rule was applied in Goldfarb).
16. 421 U.S. at 776-78.
17. Id. at 775-76. The Goldfarbs contacted over 36 attorneys; of those who replied, none
would charge less than the suggested minimum fee, and several stated that they knew of none

who would. Id. at 776.
18. Id. at 776-78, 783. The Court stated: "[The associations created] a pricing system that
consumers could not realistically escape." Id. at 783. Membership in the State Bar Association
was required in order to practice law in Virginia. Id. at 776. The ethical opinions stated, inter
alia, that "evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee
schedule adopted by his local Bar Association, raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of
misconduct ..
" Id. at 777-78.
19. Id. at 781. For example, the Court cited American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), which had involved a purely advisory fee schedule.
20. 421 U.S. at 781-83.
21. Advisory schedules have historically been treated as information exchanges, rather
than outright price fixing. An exchange might facilitate price fixing, as in American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), or it may be a legitimate effort by businessmen to improve market information. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978). The crucial distinction between price fixing (per se) and information exchanges (rule of

reason) is that the former includes an agreement lacking in the latter, to adhere to a price or
follow a particular policy. See also United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); L.

SULLIVAN, supra note 6 at § 73; Redlich, supra note 6 at 24-26.
22. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
23. Thus, for example, the American Society of Anesthesiologists was able to escape condemnation when their members agreed to adopt, publish and disseminate a relative value guide
for professional service. See United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The schedule in that case, however, was also insulated because it contained no suggestion of any monetary values, just suggested formulas for the computation of
professional time for various medical procedures. Id. at 153. Cf. Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v.

United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960) (agreement among competitors to begin negotiations from agreed list prices held unlawful per se as price fixing).
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forced the schedule through the prospect of professional discipline, the effect
was to produce adherence to the fee schedule, and thus the Bar Associations
24
were guilty of price fixing.
The opinion also rejected any notion that a learned profession was ex25
The practice of law, stated the
empt from Sherman Act proscriptions.
Court, is "trade or commerce" which falls within the ambit of the Sherman
Act. 26 The Court did indicate, however, that the public service aspects of a
profession might, in some cases, warrant treatment different from that governing other businesses. 2 7 It was left unclear exactly what that different
treatment might be.
In retrospect, it is significant that early per se price-fixing cases, such as
28
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association and United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co. ,29 were not cited to support the Court's decision. In addition,
the Chief Justice cited no Warren Court majority opinion on the price-fixing
question. 30 The Goldfarb opinion foreshadowed the coming change in court
philosophy.
Two years later, in Continental TV , Inc. v.GTE Sylvania Inc. ,31 the Burger Court made what is to date its greatest assault on the per se rule. Sylvania, a subsidiary of the giant, General Telephone and Electronics, was
accused of a per se violation of section 1 by enforcing franchise agreements
which limited its distributors to the sale of Sylvania products from specified
locations only. 32 A similar nonprice restraint, allocation of exclusive territo24. 421 U.S. at 781-83.
25. Id. at 786-88. The County Association advanced several reasons for its contention,
including the existence of state licensing regulations and that the goal of professional services is
not profit but provision of necessary services. The defendant thus argued it was totally exempt
from the Sherman Act. Id. at 787.
26. Id. As the Court stated: "[T]o read into [the Act] so wide an exemption as that urged
on us would be at odds with [congressional] purpose." Id. The Court also rejected the argument that since the Bar Association was established by act of the Virginia legislature, the Association's practice was immunized as state action under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It
could not be argued, said the Court, that the price schedule was mandated by the legislature
and thus immunized. 421 U.S. at 790-92.
27. Id. at 788 n. 17. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect,
and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with
which we are confronted today.
Id
28. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
29. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
30. The opinion does cite the concurring opinion in United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333, 337-39 (1969), in which Justice Fortas states that his understanding of Justice Douglas' majority opinion is that the case was to be analyzed under the rule of reason. See 421 U.S.
at 782. Justice Douglas' opinion in Container, silent on that question, is notably terse and indicates, at least to some, aper se analysis. For an in depth analysis of the question see Kefauver,
The Legah'ty of Dissemnzation of Market Data by Trade Associations. What Does Container Hold-, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (1972).
31. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
32. Id. at 40. Sylvania had extracted from dealers "location clauses" requiring the distrib-
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ries to distributors, was held by the Warren Court to beper se unlawful only
ten years earlier in the case of United States v. Schwinn. 33 In Sylvania, the Burger Court overruled Schwinn ,34 refused to apply the per se rule, and instead
applied the rule of reason. 35 Justice Powell, writing for a divided Court,
reasoned that the restraint was not necessarily pernicious and without redeeming effect. Therefore, he stated, a per se rule could not be applied.
36
Rather, a full-scale inquiry into the effect of the restraint was required.
Over a dissent by Justice Brennan, 37 Justice Powell thus cast into chaos
utors to resell only at designated locations. Continental TV., a San Francisco distributor who
had so agreed, opened a new outlet in Sacramento. Under pressure from its Sacramento distributor, Sylvania reduced Continental's line of credit. In response Continental withheld payments
owed to Sylvania's finance company. When the finance company sued Continental for these
payments, Continental cross-claimed against Sylvania, asserting the § 1 violation. The trial
court, Justice Clark (retired) sitting by designation, held the practice to be aper se violation. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), but
on rehearing en banc, the court reversed, 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), over two vigorous dissents,
id. at 1004, 1018.
33. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Schwinn case came to the Supreme Court only four years
after the Court had decided White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In White
Motor the Court held that the judiciary's unfamiliarity with vertical territorial restraints required remand for the study of their effects. Id. at 263-64. In Schwinn, the Court changed its
approach and held that Schwinn's allocation of exclusive territories to its independent distributors was aperse violation of§ 1. 388 U.S. at 379. The Schwnn decision was subjected to severe
criticism from some scholars. See, e.g., McClaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Distributors
and Dealers-Pies,Territories, Customers and Handling of Compettwe Products, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
161 (1968); Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed to Protect the Integrity of Franchise Distribution Systems, 36 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 63 (1967); Posner, Antitmst Polihy and the Supreme Court. An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282 (1975). But see Redlich, supra note 6.

34. 433 U.S. at 58. The Court could not find a "principled basis for distinguishing" the
Schwinn restraints from those present in Sylvania. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 57-59.
36. Id. at 49, 54-59. Relying primarily on the writings of antitrust scholars and economists,
the Court noted that competition among different brands, interbrand competition, is enhanced
by vertical restraints such as the location restrictions in Sylvanta or the exclusive territories in
Schwinn. Each "exclusive" dealer has the incentive to furnish local advertising and other pointof-sale services, such as showrooms and repair and maintenance shops. Without the restraint,
firms which also sell the manufacturer's product in the territory would take a "free ride" on the
other distributor's advertising or services, thereby discouraging the provision of these services.
Elimination of the free rider effect through allocation of territories thus improves a manufacturer's ability to compete with other brands. The Court therefore would not condemn the practiceper se. Id.

As the Court recognized, vertical restraints, while protecting interbrand competition, also
reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product in any
given market. Id. at 54. A court's job is to balance the procompetitive interbrand effects of the
vertical restraint against the concomitant reduction in intrabrand competition. The Court intimated no view on how this balancing would be done. The Court's willingness to so balance,
however, is significant in light of its refusal to engage in a similar balancing in United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In that case, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
stated that the Court's "inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition
in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formulatedperse rules." Id. at 609-10. In Topco, the Court, over the dissent
of Chief Justice Burger, id. at 613, held an agreement among competitors to divide territories
was illegal per se.
37. 433 U.S. at 71. Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan would have applied theper
se rule of Schwinn. Justice White, in a separate concurrence, would have distinguished Schwznn
from Sylvania and applied the rule of reason in Sylvania. He argued there was no need to overrule Schwinn since, in his view, the restrictions in Sylvania had "less potential for restraint of
intrabrand competition and more potential for stimulating interbrand competition" than the
exclusive territories restrictions in Schwinn. Id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
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the entire body of law under section 1.38 The little used 39 and poorly understood rule of reason 40 was brought to the forefront of antitrust analysis. But
perhaps more significant was the suggestion that per se treatment was always
' 41
Courts and
inappropriate if the restraint had any "redeeming virtue.
se illeofper
test
this
new
of
commentators began to wonder what the effect
42
restraints.
trade
of
classes
other
on
was
gality
Only a year later, the Court, by expounding on the factors that define
the rule of reason, set out to remedy some of the problems it had created. In
NationalSociey of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,43 the Court considered
the legality of a professional society's ethical canon prohibiting competitive
bidding on engineering projects. 44 The defendant in the case was a nationwide association of engineers, organized to deal with the nontechnical, business aspects of engineering. 45 The Society's code of ethics provided that
members could not submit competitive bids. The question of fees was not
even to be discussed until the prospective client had selected an engineer for
his project. 46 In 1972, the government charged that this ethical canon had
the effect of suppressing price competition, and was therefore unlawful per
se. 4 7 The Society argued that the canon promoted the interests of safety and
quality by ensuring against inferior engineering work, which might flow
from the desire and ability to cut prices. 48 In essence, the Society asserted
that the Canon was reasonable and thus insulated from section 1 condemnation, because competition among engineers was contrary to the public
49
interest.
38. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approaches.- Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Redlich, supra note 6.
39. See supra text accompanying note 12.
40. Professor Posner, upon whose writings the Court partially relied, see 433 U.S. at 55-56,
has written:
The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more
than a euphemism for nonliability. Before Shwinn, restrictions on distribution were
tested under the Rule of Reason, meaning: they were lawful. The Court in Sylvania
may not have intended by its invocation of the Rule of Reason to bless all restrictions
in distribution, but it was deceived if it thought it was subjecting those restrictions to
scrutiny under a well-understood legal standard.
Posner, supra note 38, at 14.
41. 433 U.S. at 58 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
42. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 38, at 6-12; Redlich, supra note 6, at 56 n.397; see also
Bohling, A Simplied Rule ofReasonfor VerticalRestraints. IntegratingSocial Goals, Economic Analysis
and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461, 519-24 (1979); Robinson, Antitrust Development, 80 COLUM.
L.J. 1, 14 (1980); Note, Sylvania and Beyond An Expanding Rule of Reason for DistributionalRestraints, 4 J. CORP. LAw 169, 185-89 (1978).
43. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
44. Id. at 683-84.
45. Id. at 682. The Society's membership of 69,000 represents less than one quarter of the
nation's licensed professional engineers. See id. at 681-82.
46. The Society's Code of Ethics prohibited members from soliciting or submitting competitive bids for engineering projects. A member was not permitted to give any estimate on fees,
either verbal or written, prior to selection of a project's engineer. In fact, a prospective engineer
was required to withdraw his name from consideration if a prospective client persisted in requesting a fee proposal. The Society thus sought to preserve the traditional method of selection,
based upon quality and reputation rather than price. Id. at 683-84.
47. Id. at 684. The complaint prayed for an injunction against the practice.
48. Id. at 684-85.
49. Id.
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Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,50 rejected the Society's assertions 5 ' and in'so doing set forth his understanding of the rule of reason.
Reviewing its history, 52 he stated that inquiry under the rule is limited to
balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. 53 Justice Stevens
then compared the "two complementary categories of antitrust analysis," 54
the rule of reason and the per se rule. He stated that under both categories
the judicial inquiry is directed at forming "a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." ' 55 But, the Court is not to judge the wisdom of the congressional policy in favor of economic competition. 56 The
legislative mandate in favor of free and unfettered competition cannot be
questioned by the courts.
In order to demonstrate that the Society's "public interest" argument
was fatally flawed, Justice Stevens concentrated not on the price-fixing characterization, 57 which had dominated Warren Court antitrust analysis, 58 but
rather on the restraint's impact upon competition. In fact, he hedges when
he states that the engineers' restraint is "not price fixing as such," 59 even
though the Society's practice clearly had an effect upon price. 60 The Warren Court would have condemned it on that basis alone.
In a detailed discussion, which would only have been necessary under
the rule of reason, Justice Stevens concluded that the restraint had an anticompetitive character, requiring no elaborate industry analysis. 6 ' The
Court's language, however, indicates reliance on the per se rule. The Court
asserted, for example, that allegations of better quality, 62 or even improved
health and safety 63 are not "reason[s], cognizable under the Sherman Act,
for doing away with competition. ' 64 But, by leaving unclear which rule he
was actually applying, Justice Stevens came close to obliterating the differ50. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred separately in the Court's
opinion. Id. at 699. Chief Justice Burger dissented in part, asserting tersely that the first
amendment guaranteed the right of the Society to state in its canon that competitive bidding is
unethical. Id. at 701.
51. Id. at 692-96.
52. Id. at 687-92.
53. Id. at 691-92. But see supra note 11.
54. Id. at 692. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 72.
55. 435 U.S. at 692.
56. Id.
57. See cases cited supra note 8.
58. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 74; cases cited supra note 9.
59. 435 U.S. at 692.
60. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
61. 435 U.S. at 692.
62. Id. at 693-96.
63. Id. at 696 n.22.
64. Id. at 696. See also Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.
D.C. 1979) where the court held a similar restraint among architects unlawful under the rule of
reason. The court facially distinguished the engineers case by pointing out that the architects
had not banned all price discussions between potential client and potential architect. Rather,
in Mardirosian one architect could discuss price with a client, but a second architect could not
seek to match or underbid the first. Id. at 645-48. If one notes that the practices of both the
engineers and the architects affected price, the distinction offered by the court highlights no real
difference. Although the engineers' restraint is probably more injurious, both are now clearly
illegal.
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65
ence between the per se rule and the rule of reason.
In its next term, the Supreme Court was faced with a different and
difficult price-fixing case. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) television network attacked the blanket licensure practices of two copyright performing rights societies, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). 66 These societies are
granted nonexclusive 67 performance rights by individual copyright owners;
the societies, in turn, sell a "blanket license," permitting licensees to use any
composition in the licensor's repertoire. 68 The price charged for this license
is based not upon frequency or amount of use, but rather upon the licensee's
gross revenues. 69 The societies then distribute the royalties to copyright
owners. A necessary result of this scheme is that the society must choose a
price for its license, and CBS challenged that practice of price setting as
70
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The blanket license has been in use for several decades and, although it
has often been challenged 7 1 under the antitrust laws, it has never been proscribed. 7 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in BMIv. CBS 73 was faced with
a,court of appeals opinion which, for the first time in the license's history,
decreed the practice illegal per se.4
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.7 5 Justice White,
writing for a unanimous Court,7 6 refused to apply the per se rule.7 7 He
65. See supra text accompanying note 55.
66. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). BMI is a
nonprofit corporation owned by members of the broadcasting industry and represents approximately 30,000 authors, composers, and publishers. ASCAP was organized in 1914 and represents some 22,000 composers and publishers. Id. at 4-5.
67. The nonexclusivity of the license is an important aspect of its legality. Id. at 28-30
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Prior to 1950, members granted ASCAP exclusive rights to license
their works. In 1950, the government challenged a 1941 consent decree, resulting in, inter alia,
the nonexclusivity of the license granted by ASCAP. See United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). BMI is in a similar situation. 441 U.S. at 12 n.20.
68. The societies also sell a per-program license. According to the most recent challenge to
the blanket license, the per-program license was, at least regarding television stations, an unattractive alternative to the blanket license because 1) its base percentage rate is several times
higher than the blanket license, and 2) its reporting provisions are unusually onerous. See Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,898, at 72,533 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
69. 441 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This fee, based upon a user's ability to pay, is,
as Justice Stevens points out in a dissenting opinion, nothing more than an effective price discrimination. The blanket license requires a user to purchase a license which is far broader than
his actual needs. The price he pays is unrelated to either the quantity or the quality of the
music used. Id. at 30-31. For a detailed economic analysis, see Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP. An
Economic Analysis of A PoliticalProblem, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1978).
70. 441 U.S. at 6, 8-9.
71. The license continues to be the subject of antitrust litigation. Subsequent to CBS v.
BMI-the-license was challenged and found to violate the rule of reason in Buffalo Broadcasting
Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
72. See Cirace, supra note 69. The CBS case, and the history of ASCAP and BMI in the
courts, is the subject of two excellent notes: Note, CBS v. ASCAP Blanket Licensing and the
Unresolved Conflict Between Coprightand Antitrust Law, 13 CONN. L. REV. 465 (1981); Note, Blanket
Licensing- The Clash Between Copyright Protection and the Sherman Act, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 729
(1980).
73. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

74. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
75. 441 U.S. at 7.
76. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, stated that while the practice should be evalu-
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would not characterize the practice in question as price-fixing, 7 8 stating that
the Court had some doubt whether the practice was a threat to free market
pricing. 79 "The blanket license cannot be wholly equated with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors."8 0 Factors such as lowered transaction costs through reduction of the number of individual sales, and easier
monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use made the
8
blanket license a necessary and useful part of commerce. '
The license was viewed as being unlike anything the individual copyright owners could sell.8 2 The setting of a price was a necessary consequence
of creation of this new product.8 3 Analogous to a joint venture, the legality
of the blanket license must be judged under the rule of reason rather than
under the per se rule.8 4 The Court thus remanded the case 8 5 for evaluation
of its legality under that rule. 86 Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion,8 7
would have avoided the remand; he found sufficient evidence in the record
to declare that the practice violates the rule of reason.88
With its decision in BMI, the Court concluded four years of restructuring antitrust law under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The new members of
the Court had had the opportunity to set forth their views of antitrust law.
Lower courts and commentators were predictably split on the effect and wisdom of the Court's decisions.8 9 Yet, even as BMI was being decided, the
ated under the rule of reason, there was sufficient evidence then before the Court to ban the
blanket license. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

77. Id. at 24-25.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 23.

81. Id. at 20-21. But see Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
82. 441 U.S. at 21-23.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Id. at 23. See also infratext accompanying notes 170-71.

85. 441 U.S. at 25.
86. On remand to the Second Circuit, Judge Newman held that the blanket license, at
least as regards CBS, is not an antitrust violation. See CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1980).
87. 441 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 34-38. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam),
the Supreme Court ruled that an agreement among competitors fixing credit terms affected
price and thus was a per se violation of § 1. Credit terms, held the Court, are an inseparable
part of price, and any attempt to tamper with price has always been unlawfulper se. Id. at 648.
"The fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a particular set of circumstances will
not prevent its being declared unlawfulper se." Id. at 649. The Court's decision was not surprising. In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977), the Court, including
the dissenters, agreed that in the normal case, credit terms are intimately associated with price.
For an extended discussion, see Favretto, The Per Se Rule. A/ive and Welland Lving in Catalano,
6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 11 (1981).
89. Compare Bohling, A Stmplified Rule ofReason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals,
Economic Analysts and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461 (1979); Posner, supra note 38 with Redlich,
supra note 7; Sullivan, Economics andMore Humanistic Dtrciplines: What Are The Sources of Wisdom for
Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977). See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643
F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (discussed infta note 100); Mardirosian v.
American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 636-40 (D. D.C. 1979) (discussed supra note 64);
see also, e.g., Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 126-27

(2d Cir. 1980); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
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District Court of Arizona had issued an opinion9' which was clearly influenced by the Burger Court's trend. Two years later, the Supreme Court
would be confronted with that very case, and would be presented with the
opportunity to extend its four previous opinions to a logical conclusion.

II.

ARIZONA V MARICOPA Couvrry MEDICAL SoCETY

In 1978, the State of Arizona charged that a nonprofit county medical
society, composed of competing doctors, had violated the Sherman Act by
establishing maximum fee schedules for use by its members. 9 1 Insurance
companies gained Society approval by agreeing to pay member doctors the
scheduled amount, and doctors in turn agreed to accept this payment in full
satisfaction for their services. 9 2 The doctors were permitted to charge insured patients less than but no more than the scheduled amount; they could
charge uninsured patients more than the scheduled amount. 93 Insured patients were also free to visit nonmember doctors, but then they were not
94
guaranteed full insurance coverage.
The state charged that the fee schedules had the effect of enhancing
prices, 95 primarily through periodic upward revisions of the fees. 96 The Society, on the other hand, argued that the schedules were an effective cost
containment device and assured patients full coverage. 97 The state moved
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, alleging that the
agreement was aperse violation of section 1.98 The district court, influenced
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions, denied the motion 99 and ordered a
Veizaga v. National Bd. of Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
90. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,694 (D.
Ariz. 1979), afl'd, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
91. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 337 (1982). Actually two
such societies were charged; one in Maricopa County, the other in Pima County. The complaint also charged a violation of the state antitrust law, a law which is read in conformity with
the federal statute. Id. at 336 n.l.
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Unlike the advisory relative value guide involved in United States v. American Soc'y of
Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the doctors in the Maricopa County Society: 1) agreed to abide by the plan, and 2) established a monetary conversion factor in addition
to the relative value guide. 457 U.S. at 340-41. For a discussion of how antitrust has been
applied to the health care field, see Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON
L. REV. 417 (1979); Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Disczpline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE
LJ. 443; Havighurst, ProfessionalRestraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J.
303; Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors." Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act,
1978 DUKE LJ. 645; Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a
Frameworkfor Assessing PrivateRestraints, 34 VAND. L. REv. 927 (1981); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and
the Health Care Inusty." New Wamors into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446 (1979); Comment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes." Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act,
11 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 387 (1978).
96. 457 U.S. at 341-42. But the questions of upward revision are irrelevant to the question
under § 1: whether the Sherman Act prohibits establishment of a maximum fee schedule in this
case. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
97. 457 U.S. at 342, 351.
98. Id. at 336-37.
99. 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694, at 77,897 (D. Ariz. 1979). The district judge offered three justifications for his result: 1) the Court's trend as embodied in Engineers and Sylva-
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trial under the rule of reason. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals
issued three separate opinions,'0° each judge expressing a different view.
Nevertheless the court upheld the denial of the motion, applying the rule of
reason. i01
Before the Supreme Court, the Society conceded the established principle that price-fixing agreements are illegalperse, but argued that the rule did
not apply to them because the agreements at issue: 1) fixed maximum, not
minimum prices; 2) were among members of a profession; 3) were in an industry with which the judiciary had little antitrust experience; and 4) had
02
redeeming competitive effects.i
Justice Stevens took pains to review the Court's price-fixing cases, emphasizing that both minimum and maximum price-fixing arrangements
have always been per se unlawful.' 0 3 Justice Stevens then quickly dismissed
the doctors' contention that the professional character of their business justified different treatment. The agreements involved, said the Court, "are not
premised on public service or ethical norms. . . . [T]he claim that the price
restraint will make it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the
medical profession from any other provider of goods or services." 10° 4 The
Court similarly rejected the argument that the per se rule should not apply
because the judiciary has little antitrust experience with the health care industry.' 0 5 The Sherman Act, said the Court, "establishes one uniform rule
06
applicable to all industries alike."'
ma, 2) that the professional character of the restraint dictated rule of reason treatment; and,
3) that the Supreme Court cases involving maximum price fixing did not expressly call forper se
treatment. Id. at 77,895-97.
100. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457
U.S. 332 (1982). The majority opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Sneed. It expressed
uncertainty regarding the state of antitrust law as applied to the health care field. 643 F.2d at
556. Admitting that even doctors can be motivated by economic considerations, the court refused to characterize the restraint as price fixing, since the doctors apparently lacked monopoly
power and thus could not effectively raise prices. Id. at 557. The court also concluded that
Socony-Vaaum was inapposite in light of the Supreme Court's decision in BMI. Id. at 557-58.
Judge Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion, asking for additional evidence before making the price-fixing determination. Id. at 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge Larson stated that in spite of the uncertainty created by Go/dfarb and Engineers, "the Supreme Court
." d. at 564 (Larson,
would be willing to applyperse rules to professional price tampering ..
J., dissenting). He also admonished the other members of his bench that if a cautious approach
was proper as the majority asserted, then caution counseled application of the long established
per se rule rather than embarkation upon a theory based on "erroneous legal premises and
abused . . . discretion." Id. at 569.
101. Id. at 560.
102. 457 U.S. at 342.
103. Justice Stevens traced the history of the per se rule and rule of reason, beginning with
the Court's decisions in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) and Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). He then turned to the strict rule against price
fixing, noting Justice Stone's words to that effect in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 398 (1927), and the harsh treatment of the defendants applied by Justice Douglas in
the seminal case, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Justice Stevens then quoted at length from two prior maximum price-fixing cases in the Supreme Court,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) and Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 457 U.S. at 342-48. Thus, with sweeping language, Justice Stevens
foreclosed the notion that a price restraint can be anything other than per se unlawful.
104. 457 U.S. at 349.
105. Id. at 349-5 1.
106. d. (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)).
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The defendant's principal argument was that perse treatment was inappropriate because of the presence of significant procompetitive effects. These
effects included full insurance coverage, a choice of doctors, and lower premiums.10 7 The Court rejected the argument as demonstrating "a misunderstanding of the per se concept."' 10 8 The rule that price fixing is illegalper se
precludes any argument that an individual price-fixing scheme might have a
beneficial effect.' 0 9 Such a claim, the Court stated, is so unlikely to prove
significant in a particular case that the general rule warrants application in
all price-fixing cases. " 0
Justice Stevens then noted that the goal of lower fees, allegedly flowing
from transaction cost savings,"' could be achieved without price fixing
among doctors." 2 The opinion alludes to state regulation or doctor-insurer
agreements as alternative means of accomplishing this end. 1 3 There was
thus no factual basis in the record for defendant's contention that doctors
114
alone must set the price schedule.
The dissenters argued that the doctors' agreements should be judged
under what was a rule of reason approach, citing the BMI case. 115 The
majority distinguished the BMI decision, as involving price fixing in the "literal sense" only. 1 6 The salient feature of the blanket license in BMI was
that it had characteristics quite different from anything the individual copyright owners could sell. The establishment of performance rights societies
permitted the free flow of performance rights licensure; without them, efficient selling and monitoring would be impossible. The "price fixing" involved in that case was nothing more than a producer's decision as to what
7
price he would charge for this new product, the blanket license."
Justice Stevens contrasted the doctors' maximum fee schedule with
price setting in partnerships and other joint arrangements where collective
pricing decisions are necessary." 8 He found the doctors' fee schedule analogous neither to a partnership's price setting nor to the blanket license in
BMI.1'9 No new and distinct product was offered. Rather, the only effect
was to permit the sale of medical services at predetermined prices, avoiding
107. 457 U.S. at 351.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. As Justice Black said in Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
This principle ofper se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned,
but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
111. 457 U.S. at 352.
112. Id. at 352-54.
113. Id. (citing, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)).
See also Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 592 F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979); Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981).
114. 457 U.S. at 352-53 n.26.
115. Id. at 357-67. (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. 457 U.S. at 355-56.
117. Id. at 355-56 & nn. 31-32.
118. Id. at 356-57.
119. Id.
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the interplay of free market forces. 120 Such arrangements among independ21
ent competing entrepreneurs, declared the Court, remain illegal per se.'
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell dissented on the question of whether to apply the per se rule.122 The dissenters
would have avoided the price-fixing characterization in two ways. They
12 3
found no showing in the record that the plan was plainly anticompetitive,
and they would have held that the facts of Mancopa County fell within
BMI.124 Regarding the first, Justice Powell did not expressly find that competitive efficiencies were present, but instead he bemoaned the lack of a detailed record.' 2 5 He noted that the plan "seems to be in the public
interest,"' 26 although he could point to no specific procompetitive benefit. 127 According to the dissent, if significant procompetitive effects could be
28
found, per se treatment would be inappropriate.
Turning to their second argument, the dissenters would hold that the
agreement in Maricopa County had enough in common with the blanket license in BMI to justify rule of reason treatment.' 29 Justice Powell asserted
that the plan has characteristics different from the usual horizontal arrangement,' 30 similar to the combination in BMI. Several similarities between
BMI and Marcopa County were said to be of significance: each involved competitors in cooperative pricing, each addressed the need for better service to
consumers, and each created a new product through otherwise unattainable
efficiencies. 131
The plaintiff State of Arizona, wrote Justice Powell, had not yet discharged its burden of proving the plainly anticompetitive character of the
restraint. 132 In basing its per se condemnation of this novel plan upon a
limited record, the majority had lost sight of the central "consumer welfare"
purpose of the Sherman Act.' 33 Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Powell
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 356-57.
122. 457 U.S. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part
in the consideration of the case.
123. Id. at 359-64.
124. Id. at 364-66.
125. Id. at 358, 361, 367.
126. Id. at 357.
127. Justice Powell noted that the Society's plan "forecloses no competition," id. at 360,
since consumers and doctors are free to participate or withdraw. Even if that is so, the fact that
no injury results from the restraint cannot be equated with aprocompetlhde benefit. Second, the
dissent asserts that the insurers adequately represent consumer interests, quality service at lower
prices. Id. at 360-61. But, as the majority properly notes, the plan allegedly reduces transaction
costs, not medical costs. Id. at 352 n.25. Thus, the plan does not promote that which consumers
desire: lower medical cost and quality of care. See infa text accompanying note 156.
128. 457 U.S. at 352 (Powell, J., dissenting). See infratext accompanying notes 151-62, 17578.
129. 457 U.S. at 361-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 360.
131. Id. at 364-65. Justice Powell argued that the Societies had created a different product
in that they "set up an innovative means to deliver a basic service-insured medical care from a
wide range of physicians of one's choice-in a more economical manner." Id. at 365 n. 12. See
infta text accompanying notes 167-74.
132. Id. at 366.
133. Id. at 367.
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would have remanded the case for trial under the rule of reason.
III.

THE REVITALIZATION OF THE PER SE RULE

The Court's decision in Maricopa County is a stunning reaffirmation of
the per se rule against price fixing. After several years of movement away
34
from the use of perse rules, the Court has for the present halted this trend.'
While Maricopa County is certain to engender some confusion, it must nevertheless be lauded as a significant step toward reestablishment of a predictable and functional rule of law.
Marcopa County, though, is not particularly noteworthy in its assertion
that professions must not be treated differently from other businesses in the
legality of their pricing practices. The Court thus continues to clarify its
statement in Goldfarb, left open in Engineers,135 that the public service aspects
of professions might require varied rules. Goldfarb had made clear that professions are not exempt from the Sherman Act's proscriptions;1 36 Marcopa
County confirms the thrust of Engineers: professions will be treated no differently from other providers of goods and services, at least regarding agreements affecting price.
In fact, Engineers had decreed that even if a professional agreement improves the quality of service, it remains unlawful if there is an affect upon
price.' 37 The doctors in Maricopa County did not even assert that their agreement improved the quality of medical service offered. They alleged, rather,
that the agreement made payment easier for customers.' 38 The latter, said
Justice Stevens, is a concern endemic to all industries, and it alone will not
distinguish
the doctors'
restraint
from agreements
among
39
nonprofessionals. 1
Justice Stevens also reaffirmed the long-standing principle that the per
se rule applies to all industries alike. The doctors had argued that per se
treatment was inappropriate because the judiciary had little antitrust experience in the health care field. 140 The Court has, in the past, spoken of not
applying a per se rule in areas in which it was unfamiliar.' 4 ' These state142
ments, however, referred to unfamiliar restraints rather than industries.
Price fixing, the restraint involved in Maricopa County, has always been illegal.' 43 Agreements establishing price ceilings have twice been condemned
by the Supreme Court. 44 The fact that courts might lack experience in the
134. The existence of such a trend cannot be doubted. See, e.g., supra notes 99-100.
135. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
136. 421 U.S. at 787-88. See supra text accompanying notes 13-27.
137. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
138. 457 U.S. at 348-49.
139. Id. at 349.
140. Id. at 350-51.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1963).
142. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Justice Stevens refers to
the distinction in Mancopa County, 457 U.S. at 349 n.19.
143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
144. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). These cases arguably involved "vertical" restraints, agree-

19831

ANTITRUST'S PER SE RULE

health care field does not warrant a different rule of law. In fact, the uniformity of the per se rule is one of its primary virtues. 145
The two most important aspects of the Court's opinion are: 1) the role
of the price-fixing characterization in section 1 analysis 14 6 and 2) the narrowing of BMI. Regarding the first, Justice Stevens' opinion is founded
upon his description of the agreement as one fixing prices.' 47 Once this
characterization is made, per se treatment necessarily follows; questions of
procompetitive benefits become wholly irrelevant.
In its first four cases, the Burger Court apparently retreated from the
characterization approach. Engneers bypassed the characterization issue,
and BMI questioned its utility 148 in the copyright field. Marcopa County
reverses this trend. While the dissent calls for more detailed rules, 149 the
majority applies the traditional rule that an agreement which affects price is
to be placed in the forbidden category. 150 Characterization's role has, with
the Marcopa County decision, been restored after a short hiatus.
The dissenters would have avoided the price-fixing label.151 Relying on
occasional Court language to the effect that agreements in theper se category
had no purpose except stifling competition, 152 Justice Powell would have
allowed the alleged procompetitive virtue to remove the practice from theper
se category. 153 Once removed, trial under the rule of reason must follow.
The dissent, however, seems to have taken that language out of context; language referring to "no purpose except stifling of competition," or "lack of
any redeeming virtue" was not intended as a talisman.' 54 It is noteworthy
ments between firms at different levels of the distribution system. The agreement in Marcopa
County was among entrepreneurs at the same level of competition, and is known as a "horizontal" arrangement. But Justice Stevens wrote that: 1) the earlier cases did have horizontal aspects as well as vertical, and 2) in general, horizontal restraints are less defensible than vertical
restraints. 457 U.S. at 348 n.18. But see Blair and Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer
Welfare: An Econonuc Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981); Easterbrook, Maxmum Frce Fixing,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981).
145. 457 U.S. at 349-51, 353-54. Even Professor Bork, whose writings have greatly influenced the Burger Court, wrote: "The benefits of a broad per se category in ease of enforcement
and predictability are so great that its legitimate availability constitutes one of the main tradition's chief assets." Bork, supra note 8, at 837. See also Redlich, supra note 6, at 54-58. Sullivan,
supra note 89. But see Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
146. See supra note 8. The characterization approach is well developed and explained in L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 74.
147. See 457 U.S. at 348-54.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
149. 457 U.S. at 366 (Powell, J., dissenting). But the characterization approach to price
fixing is not as unclear as the dissent believes. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at §§ 74-78, 81, 8692; Redlich, supra note 6, at 14 n.91.
150. See supra text accompanying note 103.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
152. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49, 50 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, quoted in Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 50.
153. 457 U.S. at 361-64.
154. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). To confirm that
language such as this is not to be taken literally, one need only look to the remainder of the
paragraph in which it is contained. Justice Black therein states that regarding restraints in the
per se categories, a general reasonableness inquiry is "so often fruitless" as to be judicially un-
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that Justice Stevens avoided reference to this "standard".
Assuming arguendo the dissent's view of the significance of a benefit, Justice Stevens demonstrated that the procompetitive benefit was not even present.' 55 He noted that in Maricopa County, Arizona about seventy percent
of the doctors offered the benefits of the Society's plan, and that a patient
therefore had a seven in ten chance of choosing a doctor who offered full
insurance coverage. In other markets that do not have the plan, however,
presumably at least seventy percent of the doctors also offer "usual, customary, and reasonable" rates, that typical insurers will reimburse. A prospective patient in those counties, therefore, also has a seven in ten chance of full
coverage. 156 A patient is no better off in Maricopa County than is a patient
elsewhere. The alleged benefit to the patient, guaranteed coverage with freedom of choice of doctor, simply is not effected as a result of the doctors'
agreement.
Further, the allegation of lower insurance cost, perhaps the most signifi57
cant potential procompetitive benefit, was rejected as a valid defense.'
Such "lower cost" defenses historically have been invalid in price-fixing
cases.' 58 There is, however, an important distinction between the defendant's argument and previous "lower cost" defenses. The doctors did not allege that the agreement reduced medical costs, but rather that a
prearrangement on fees makes medical insurance less expensive by improving the accuracy of the insurer's risk calculation. 59 But, says the Court,
even if some prearrangement is desirable, it is not necessary for the doctors to
set the maximum price.' 6 State regulation or insurer-doctor arrangements
are possible alternatives. 161 "[In any event," wrote Justice Stevens, "there is
no reason to believe that any savings that might accrue from this arrangement would be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of these kinds
' 62
of insurance plans."'
The dissenters take a different view of the significance of potentially
lower insurance rates. Justice Powell analogized the case to BMI, noting
that the agreements in both BMI and Maricopa County were intended to proeconomical. Id. By inference then, a reasonableness inquiry in aper st case would often, but not
always, result in condemnation. If the "no purpose except stifling of competition" language is
read outside its context, the per se rule and its attributes would be forever lost. Indeed as the
Court stated in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972): "Whether or not we
would decide this [perse] case the same way under the rule of reason . . .is irrelevant to the
issue before us." Ste alsoArizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 332, 343-44
(1982); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
155. 457 U.S. at 351-52.
156. Id. Justice Stevens indicated this presumption was in accord with the Society's figures.
Id. at 352 n.24. Discussions between this author and members of the medical and insurance
fields confirm the validity of those figures.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
158. Se, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 663, 647 (1980); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897).
159. 457 U.S. at 352 n.25.
160. Id. 352-53.
161. Id. The fact that the doctors can best compute medical fees does not insulate them
fromperse treatment. Se 457 U.S. at 353.
162. Id. at 353-54.

19831

ANTITRUSTS PER SE RULE

vide "better service" to the consumer through the creation of a new and
more efficient product.16 3 Justice Powell's approach is clearly not as refined
as that of Justice Stevens, who distinguished between improved care and a
patient's ability to pay, 164 finding that an allegation of the former was not
166
present. 165 Justice Powell simply refers to "better service."
Cheaper full insurance coverage is the "new product" created by the
doctors, according to Justice Powell.' 67 He would thus hold that, as in BMI,
the doctors' agreements are price fixing only in the "literal sense."' 68 Yet
the crucial distinction, according to the majority, lay in the fact that the
doctors had created no new product; 169 they sold only medical services. It
was the price for these services that the doctors tried to affect through agreement. In BMI, by contrast, the societies were created to sell what was, in
fact, a new product, the blanket license.
Justice Stevens also analogized the BMI blanket license to a joint venture or partnership which involved the creation of a new entity.' 70 This new
entity would naturally have to price its product. For instance, doctors with
different specialties might combine to form a new business entity which offered a wider range of health care services. In such an arrangement, each
doctor would give up his identity as an independent competitor in order to
become a member of the group, much as a composer delegates his price setting power to the performing rights societies. 17 Price setting by such an
entity is a necessary part of our economic system.
The agreement in Maricopa County, however, was "fundamentally different."' 172 It involved no new product and no new entity.' 73 Each doctor
maintained his individual identity as a competitor. The Court has declared
repeatedly that any agreement among individual competitors that establishes a fee schedule of any kind is unlawful per se.1 74 At least four Justices
are unwilling to change this rule.
Having found that the doctors' agreements were illegal per se, the Court
saw no need to analyze in depth the restraint's anticompetitive nature. The
entire history of the Sherman Act is replete with judicial statements that, in
price-fixing cases, no such inquiry is required.1 75 The maximum price wrinkle is not unfamiliar to the courts, and it is easily seen how the doctors'
conspiratorial price ceiling tends to become a uniform price. 17 6 Each doctor,
163. Id. at 364-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 138-39.
165. 457 U.S. at 349.

166. Id. 364-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167. Id. 365 n.12.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 361-64.
457 U.S. at 356-57.
Id.
Id. at 2480.
Id. at 2479.
"Neither the foundations nor the doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from

the sale of health insurance policies. The members of the foundations [the doctors] sell medical
services." Id.
174. See cases cited supra note 8.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 340 U.S. 150 (1940).
176. 457 U.S. at 348. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
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confident of the prospect of full payment from an insurer, has little or no
incentive to lower prices to insured patients. The patient makes the choice
of doctor without considering the price; he need only be concerned with
whether the doctor is a Society member. Price competition among Society
members is thus eliminated; the pricing decision is removed from the marketplace and placed in the Society's smokefilled rooms. 1 7 7 The Sherman
Act, from its inception, has proscribed any such removal. Justice Stevens
thus stated that the doctors' agreements "fit squarely into the horizontal
178
price fixing mold."'
The dissent, on the other hand, would not condemn the doctors' plan
on the limited record before the Court. The case reached the Court on motion for partial summary judgment, the State of Arizona demanding per se
treatment. Justice Powell indicated that he would not characterize the
agreement as a per se violation without additional information. 1 79 But such
an approach in every case would undermine the utility of the per st rule
8
180
is to enhance judicial economy. 3
whose purpose, at least in part,
In conclusion, Justice Stevens praises in general terms the benefits of the
dissenting); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). See also
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at § 78.
177. Antiseptic-smelling corridors? In addition, the restraint reduces the incentive to innovate. 457 U.S. at 348.
178. 457 U.S. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. There are those who believe that the antitrust laws in general, and the per se rule in
particular, have social as well as economic goals. Foremost among these social goals is the
protection of small businesses and independent decisionmaking. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) where Judge Hand stated:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small
producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in
which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These
considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think
the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.
Id. at 427. Judge Hand added that "[t]hroughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and
in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete
with each other." Id. at 429.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), Justice Douglas stated:
But beyond all that there is the effect on the community when independents are swallowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee owners. Then
there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local leadership is diluted. . . . These are the
prices which the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in bigness on the part of
industry.
Id. at 318-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Black, adding strength to this view, used it as the basis of his decision in KieferStewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), stating:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors to fix
maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the Sherman Act. For such
agreements, no less than those to fi"minimum prices, cri/ple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sellin accordance with their own jldgrnent.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-78
(1966); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
Commentators have also expressed this view. Blake and Jones have stated:
Another political objective of antitrust is the enlargement of individual liberty ...
[lit was the purpose of the antitrust laws to expand the range of consumer choice and
entrepreneurial opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets of numerous
buyers and sellers, assuring ease of entry to such markets, and protecting participants--particularly small businessmen-against exclusionary practices.
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per se rule,' 82 concluding with the almost proverbial suggestion that the doctors take their case to Congress. 183 The Court's commendation of the per se
rule in Maricopa County is particularly interesting; mention of the virtues of
theper se rule is notably absent from Goldfarb 184 and Engineers,' 5 and is contained in a mere footnote in Sldania t 86 At least four members of the Court
now clearly approve of a broad per se rule against price fixing.
The apparent difference of opinion which has arisen between Justices
Stevens and Powell is worthy of continued observation. The battle will undoubtedly continue for the last word in shaping the nature and policy of the
Sherman Act. But the Supreme Court, which in recent years has concentrated on the rule of reason, has once again demonstrated its preference for
the per se rule. While the future remains uncertain, the per se rule has returned to improve predictability and reaffirm the roles of Congress and the
judiciary in formulating antitrust law.
CONCLUSION

With the Court's decision in Marcopa County, the per se rule, at least for
now, retains its vitality in antitrust analysis. The four-three decision, however, leaves open the possibility that the Court will again shift its approach.' 8 7 Justice Stevens, joining the remaining Warren Court
members,' 8 8 has reaffirmed a wise rule and its traditions. If a restraint is
characterized as price fixing, it will be condemned per se; there is no need for
elaborate inquiry into alleged procompetitive benefits or redeeming virtues.

Blake & Jones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1965). See also Redlich,
supra note 6; Sullivan, supra note 89.
Similar concerns motivated other antitrust legislation. See the statements by Representative Celler, 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949), and Senator Kefauver, 96 CONG. REC. 16,450 (1950),
regarding the need for stronger measures against economic concentration.
181. 457 U.S. at 343-44 & n.14.
182. Id. at 355-57.
183. Id. See also Borsody, supra note 95; Kallstrom, supra note 95; Rosoff, supra note 95.
184. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
185. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
186. Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (1977).
187. Justice Blackmun took no part in the Marcopa County decision. It is not clear which
side of the argument he would favor. In United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972),
Justice Blackmun concurred separately in Justice Marshall's majority opinion, stating that the
per se rule "appears to be so firmly established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not
oppose it." Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But in Syl ania, Justice Blackmun agreed
with the majority, and thus supported the Court when it overruled Schwinn's per se approach in
favor of the rule of reason. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. Justice Stewart, the "perennial antitrust dissenter," has been replaced by Justice O'Connor, whose views in the area of
antitrust are, as yet, unknown. Redlich, supra note 6, at 46.
188. Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan made up the remainder of the four-judge majority in Martopa County, It is noteworthy that it was justice Stevens, in Engineers, 435 U.S. 679,
681 (1978), who first elevated the phrase "rule of reason" to "Rule of Reason." In Marcopa
County, Justice Stevens has reduced the phrase to lower case designation. 457 U.S. at 342.

